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In appellate adjudicatbn, &Cis10118 
are rendered by a rnulthxmber court 
as a collective entity, mt by individual 
judgesmy& legal scholars have only 
just bepun to explore the f o d  
and i n f o d  promaws by which 
individualvmtes are tramdonned into 
a eo11ective judgment In p e p  
they have paid insufEclent attention 
to the ways in which the vote of each 
individual judge is influend by 
the v i m  of her colleagues on a 
multimember court. 
In recent years, a growing number of 
political scientists &loring judicial 
behavior have modeled th& aspect of 
adjudication. Some theorists have 
recognized, as Lee Epstein and Jack Knight 
write in The Choices justices Muke (1998), 
that judges "are strategic actors who realize 
that their ability to achieve their goals 
de~ends on a consideration of the 
A 
preferences of others, of the choices they 
expect others to make, and of the 
~titutional context in which they act." 
In certain contexts, a rational judge will 
deviate from her personal sincere -views 
about the law in brder to secure the,most 
desirable collective decision possible, -given 
the views held by the other rel-t 
participants (judges or other governmental 
actors) who share input into that M 
collective decision. 
This political science scholarship is 
either empirical or predictive, identifjmg 
when strategic behavior does or is likely to 
occur. It tells us n o h g  about how judges 
ought to operate. Thls normative question is 
my focus here: Under what circumstances, 
and for what ends, may a judge appropriately 
engage in strategic behavior as a member of 
a multimember court? Not infrequently as 
kwis Kornhauser and Lawrence Sager have 
noted ("The One and the Many: 
Adjudcation in Collegd Courts," 81 
Califomiu Law Review 1 [1993]), a judge 
will &cover that by supporting an 
outcome or rationale with which she 
on multimember courts 
- - 
C 
and Strategic Voting Norms on Multimember 
Courts" and is reprinted with permission 
from Michqpn Law Review, Augwt 1999, 
Vol. 97, no. 8. Copyright 1999 by The 
Michigan law Review Association. Thefull 
article, with citations, is availabZefrum 
Law Quadrangle Notes or the author 
dmgrees, she can prevent her courtS 
adoption of some other outcome or 
rationale that she thinks worse either for 
justice in the case before her or for the state 
of the law in general. When such 

The more capacious or 
multivariate a justice's 
jurisprudential methodology. 
the more facts will become 
relevant to her comparison 
and ranking of alternative 
legal rules. 
arise, must a judge always 
vote for iules that reflect her best personal 
judgment as to how a legal issue ought to 
be addressed without considering how her 
input will alfect the Court's collective 
output? Or may the judge vole to secure 
what she deems the best possible collective 
resolution of the case, even if LO do so she 
must strategically suppress or misrepresent 
her sincere personal views? 
Throughout this article, I shall use the 
term "smcere voting" to refer to the vote 
that represents an individual judge's top- 
ranked or ideal judgment as to what 
constitutes the best response to resolve a 
discrete legal controversy, without 
c~nsidering the impact of his vote on the 
substantive collective result in h ~ s  court or 
in other institutions. In other words, a 
judge votes sincerely if he supports the 
position that he honestly thinks should win 
arid that he would endorse were he alone 
on the court. I shall use the term "strategc 
voting" to refer to a judge's decision to vote 
for a position that does not truly reflect his 
"sincere" judgment in order to secure the 
best feasible outcome gven the influence of 
his colleagues in the decisionmalang 
process. To make this inquiry more 
manageable, I confine my focus to strategc 
behavior in merit determinations by justices 
on the U.S. Supreme Court. 
Strategic decisionmaking 
At the outset, let me identify this 
project's central premlse concerning judlcial 
motivation Subject to resource constraints, 
judges endeavor to d~scern and rendei the~r 
best judgment as to the proper resolution of 
cases accord~ng to their best conception of 
the law By this assumption I intend to 
distlngulsh my analyt~cal approach from 
lhat employed by much recent l~terature 
concerning judlaal behamor, whlch posits 
thal judges employ instrun~ental rational~ty 
LO advance one or more personal agendas 
(such as a desire to imbue the substantwe 
content of the law w t h  then personal 
policy preferences, to enhance thelr 
professional reputation and personal 
prestige, and to cnhance leisure) 
The strategc pursuit of legtimate 
adjudicatoiy values falls into two categories: 
strategc voting to improve the institutional 
efficacy of the Court's collective product 
through ~ t s  quantitative corm ("form-driven" 
strateges); and strategc voting to improve 
the substantive content of the Court's 
collective product ("content-driven" 
strategies). Before delving into the details, 
however, let me introduce an analytic 
approach that is relevant for assessing the 
attractiveness of strategc voting across a 
range of circumstances. 
A. Assessing the magnitude of 
perceived error (MPE) of the 
Court's OlltpUt. 
On a multimember court, sincere voting 
by a justice d l  often lead to a collective 
outcome that she believes is wrong. She 
might, through strategc voting, be able to 
improve the collective outcome from a 
position she considers wrong to one she 
considers less wrong. To decide whether it 
is worth seizing h s  opportunity she must 
first consider how important it is for her to 
supplant che greater error with the lesser one. 
To make this assessment, she must 
determine not only her sincere order of 
preference for various rules (R1 through 
Rn); she must also establish the relative 
degree of error in adopting each suboptimal 
rule. This latter determination I shall call 
the "ma,@tude of perceived error" (MPE). 
The following factors, anlong others, may 
be relevant to this calculation: 
Error costs. What principles are at 
stake in the choice between two rules? 
What tangible benefits or burdens are being 
allocated? A justice might care more about 
articulating the best rule when it svill 
determine issues of personal liberty, say 
guiltlinnocence or imprisonment/esecution, 
than when the ~ u l e  will determine issues of 
financial consequence, say availability of 
punitive damages, or amoral policy 
concerns, say a procedural pleading 
requirement. 
Error size. What is the size of a rule's 
perceived error? If the legal issue involves 
personal liberty, how much will be wrongly 
granted or denied? If the legal issue involves 
money, h o ~ 7  m~lch will be wrongly allocated? 
Error rigidity. Can those governed by 
the rule circumvent its erroneous 
application? A justice might care more 
about correctness with rules that impose 
immutable requirements on private conduct 
than with those that merely establish 
default rules around whch private parties 
can maneuver. 
Error duration. How much precedential 
sipficance will the legal rule have? The 
more frequently the same or substantially 
equivalent issues will arise in the future, the 
greater the temporal "ripple effect" created 
by the Instant Case, and thus the more 
important it is to be correct today 
Error certitude. How confident is the 
justice in her ranlungs based on the 
aforementioned variables? The more certain 
she is about R1, the more she will perceive 
any error as significant. 
An MPE assessment of t h s  sort, in one 
form or another, determines a justice's 
incentive to engage in form-driven and 
content-driven strategic voting. Of course, 
the particular factors (and weights there00 
included in a justice's MPE assessment are 
derived from her jurisprudential paradigm, 
and, more specially, the judgment criteria 
that guide her legal interpretations. The 
more capacious or multivariate a justice's 
jurisprudential methodology, the more facts 
will become relevant to her comparison and 
ranlung of alternative legal rules. 
B. Strategic voting to improve the 
form of collective decisions. 
The form of a multinlember court's 
product refers to the size of the justice's 
agreement (e.g., unanimous, majority 
plurality, or singular). Specific coalition 
sizes can promote various institutional 
values, and occasionally a justice's desire to 
shape a particular coalition d l  incline her 
to endorse an outcome she views as 
substantatively suboptimal. She might vote 
insincerely with respect to substance to 
forge a majority coahtion supporting a 
disposition of the case, she might do so to 
forge a majority coalition supporting an 
opinion articulating a specific legal rule, 
and she might do so to forge a supermajority 
coalition such as a unanimous opinion. 
1. Formation of maj ority-disposition 
coalitions. 
If the Instant Case presents three or 
more plausible dispositions, sincere voting 
might mean that no majority agrees on a 
single preferred disposition (for example, 
the justices might split among affirm, 
reverse, and remand). Under the Court's 
prevailing aggregation rules, such a division 
prevents the Court from deciding the case. 
The Court could avoid the potential 
impasse through various voting protocols, 
including: (a) adopt the disposition with 
largest plurality support (if any); (b) hold a 
"run-off' vote between the top two vote- 
getting dispositions; or (c) compare 
dispositions two at a time, and select the 
option that defeats all other alternatives in 
head-to-head competition if one emerges. 
The Court has eschewed these 
structured routes. Rather, individual justices 
"play chicken" until one faction gves in and 
shifts to its second-ranked rather than top- 
ranked dsposition. In the final set of 
opinions issued, each of the factions (which 
might include from one to four justices) 
articulates its sincere position. But one of 
the minority factions then explains that, in 
order to construct a majority-disposition 
coalition necessary- to decide the case, the 
faction members will join another faction 
by voting for what they consider to be the 
second-best disposition. 
A justice's willingness to switch from his 
sincere to second-best disposition should 
depend on both institutional and 
substantive variables. First, how much 
value does he place on constructing a 
majority-disposition coalition such that the 
Court can issue a judgment in the Instant 
Case? Second, based on the magnitude of 
perceived error assessment, how strong is 
his preference for his top-ranked 
disposition (Dl) over his second (Dl), and 
his second-ranked over the third (D3)? 
It  is difficult to determine just how 
frequently sincere voting generates such 
three-disposition impasses. The practice of 
resolving them does suggest, however, 
general acceptance of an adjudicative norm 
that sincere views about case disposition 
may be sacrified in order to facilitate the 
Court's case-deciding function. 
2. Formation of majority-opinion 
coalitions. 
Perhaps much more frequently, a 
majority of the Court will agree on a single 
disposition but disagree as to the optimal 
legal rule justifying that disposition. Sincere 
voting will leave the majority disposition 
supported by two or more divergent rules, 
each championed by a minority faction of 
one to four justices. Such fractured support 
for the Court's disposition undermines 
various institutional values. 
First, a fractured decision undermines 
the clarity of the legal rules that will govern 
future disputes, thereby increasing the 
unpredictability of the law's application to 
primary conduct and increasing the costs of 
future decisionmalung by subsequent 
courts confronting the same legal issues. 
Second, it undermines the durability of 
legal rules, both by weakening the 
precedential value of the Instant Case, and 
perhaps also by diminishing public respect 
for judicial decisions generally Third, it 
undermines the expressive function of 
adjudication, by failing to articulate a 
singular, coherent justification for the 
judicial decisions. 
In response to these institutional 
concerns, one or more justices often 
deviates from her substantively preferred 
mle in order to accommodate her 
colleagues sufficiently to form a majority- 
opinion coalition. Sometimes, the vote- 
shifting faction's opinion candidly reveals 
the decision to vote strategcally More 
frequently, the vote-shifting faction 
suppresses its sincere views in the 
published opinions, and the strategc 
behavior can be detected, if at all, only 
through careful research of what occurred 
behind the scenes. For example, as Epstein 
and Kn~ght note in The ChoicesJtlstices 
Make, Justice Powell voted insincerely in 
Nixon v. Fitqerald 457 U.S. 731 (1982) in 
order to forge a majority coalition; they 
quote Powell: "[Ilt is evident that a Court 
opinion is not assured if each of us remains 
with our first preference votes . . . . As I 
view the Nixon cases as uniquely requiring 
a Court opinion, I am now prepared to 
defer to [he wishes of you [Chief Justice 
Burger], Bill Rehnquist, and Sandra" 
[Sandra Day O'Connor] in order to lorge a 
single opinion of the Court. 
It is frequently assumed that, in making 
these calculations, the majority will 
converge in a moderate or median position. 
This may well be quite likely when the 
justices' ideal points can be lined up nicely 
in a single-peaked fashion along a single 
dimension, for instance, from liberal to 
conservative. Convergence on a center 
position along the spectrum is not 
guaranteed, however, depending on the 
effects of small-group dynamics. 
And sometimes the options under 
discussion cannot easily be aligned along a 
single dimension. Thus convergence in 
form does not theoretically imply 
movement toward a schematically median 
or substantively moderate position. 
3. Formation of supermajority coalitions. 
More mfrequently, justices coordinate 
their voting to produce a unanimous 
opinion. Unanimity establishes a very 
durable judicial precedent, and it may elicit 
greater respect from nonjudicial actors, 
both ensuring short-term compliance with 
the Instant Case disposition and ensuring 
long-term respect for the decision's 
underlying principles. More specifically, 
coordinated unanimity appears to be 
strategcally deployed to counter perceptible 
threats to the Court's legal (and sometimes 
moral) authority 
Even where unanimity is not attainable, 
justices might also feel some impulse to add 
another voice to an existing majority 
coalition. Such "extra" joinders may add to 
a precedent's durability, which a justice 
might value even at h e  cost of a sincere vole. 
For each of the types of coalitions 
described in this section, a justice would 
weigh the institutional values to be gained 
against the cosu of insincerity in the 
particular case, which may include 
instilutional costs as well. Form-driven 
strategic voting appears to be a generally 
accepted practice on the Court. It is difficult 
for outsiders to identify each occurrence, 
however; justices understandably do not 
candidly announce their decisions to form 
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insincere coalitions when doing so would 
undermine their slrategic purpose of 
projecting solidarity 
C. Strategic voting to improve the 
content of legal rules. 
Due to conventional voting protocols, 
appellate courts offer individual judges 
fewer opportunities to engage in content- 
dri-ven strategic voting than are available to 
members of many other collegial bodies. 
For example, legislatures often decide issues 
through a series of votes comparing two 
options at a time, sometimes called a 
motion-and-amendment process, such that 
savvy, sophisticated voting on early choices 
frequently can manipulate the ultimate path 
of alternative pairings and hence the 
substantive outcome. On the Supreme 
Court, each justice typically registers a 
single vote to dispose of the entire case, 
rather than a vote resolving each issue 
raised by the case. Thus multiple-issue 
cases do not generally present a justice with 
an opportunity to misrepresent her views 
on one or more issues just to dictate the 
preferred resolution of the case as a wlzole. 
This said, a justice may still have the 
opportunity to guide the Court's collective 
output toward her sincere view through 
various forms of strategic voting behavior. I 
wli focus primarily on two such scenarios, 
one unilateral and one bilateral. 
1. Unilateral strategic voting to influence 
a discrete legal rule. 
Sometimes a justice, by supporting a 
legal rule with which she disagrees, can 
unilaterally prevent a collective outcome 
that she considers even worse. Such a 
unilateral strategy might be attractive in 
either of two circumstances, both of which 
can helpfully be illustra~ed by locusing on 
Justice Brennan's behavior in Craig lJ. Boren 
429 U.S. 190 (1976). 
Under an intentionally simplified version 
of the case, the relevant legal issue was 
ulhether discrimination on the basis of sex 
should be subject to strict scrutiny (SS), 
intermediate scrutiny (IS), or rational basis 
scmtiny (RBS), Suppose the justices' first- 
rank judgments divided them into three 
equal-sized factions as follows: Justice 
Brennank faction preferred SS; Justice 
Powell's faction preferred IS; and Justice 
Rehnquistk faction preferred RBS. Justice 
Brennank first-rank judgment can be 
gleaned from the fact that he recently had 
advocated SS in Frontier0 v. Richardson 41 1 
U.S. 677 (1973), though he had failed to 
convince a majority But in Craig, Brennan 
circulated a draft opinion for the Court that 
advocated intermediate scrutiny, a view that 
ultimately won the day 
Brennan apparently concluded that it 
was preferable to vote strategically to 
establish a durable precedent now for IS, 
rather than to vote sincerely for SS. There 
are two different scenarios under whch 
such a strategic maneuver makes sense. The 
first ("Craig I") involves an effort to 
influence the precedential sipficance of 
the decision, assuming that all other justices 
remain steadfast; and the second ("Craig 11") 
involves an effort to influence the collective 
outcome by encouraging another justice to 
change her vote. 
First, Brennan might have assumed that 
the Court would remain fractured across 
the three tests as described above, and that 
Powell and his faction would join the 
Brennan faction in invalidating the sex- 
based classification. If so, Powell's IS test 
would have established a precedent of sorts 
under the narrowest-grounds rule. But 
Brennan might plausibly have feared that an 
increasingly conservative Court would 
embrace RBS in a future case, bmshng the 
weak Craig precedent for IS aside. Brennan 
could then try to pretennit this most 
disfavored possibility by strengthening the 
Craig precedent, through joining Powell's 
position to forge a majority-opinion 
coalition invalidating the statute under 
intermediate scrutiny This Craig I scenario 
illustrates Brennank ability to forestall a 
highly disfavored outcome (a majority- 
backed precedent for RBS in a future case) 
by influencing the precedential significance 
of  he Instant Case. 
The Craig I1 scenario involves an effort 
by a strategic-minded justice to induce a 
colleague to change her articulated position, 
thus changing the collective outcome in a 
favorable direction. Such an opportunity 
may arise whenever the colleague's 
preference is multidimensional, meaning 
there are two or more variables chat drive 
her ranking of rules. In such circumstances 
a justice sometimes can, by strategcally 
repositioning lzirnself, create or destroy 
multidimensional options and thus 
influence the colleague's selection from 
among the available options. 
For example, suppose Justice Powell and 
his faction are concerned with both the 
substance and form of the collective 
decision in Craig. Powell favors IS, but he 
also favors construction of a majority- 
opinion coalition to secure the concomitant 
institutional benefits. Supose further that 
Powell's form-driven preference dominates, 
such that he prefers to forge a majority 
opinion even at the cost of abandoning IS. 
If Powell prefers RBS to SS, then he would 
be inclined to join the Rehnquist faction at 
RBS LO secure the institutional values of a 
majority-opinion coalition. Brennan could 
rationally tiy to forestall this most 
disfavored possibility by embracing IS 
rather than SS. This strategic maneuver 
would induce Powell to stay with IS rather 
than shift to RBS, by enabling Powell to 
secure both h s  preferred substance (IS) and 
form (joining Brennan in a majority- 
opinion coaliton). This Craig I1 scenario 
illustrates Brennank ability to avert a highly 
disfavored outcome (a majority-backed 
precedent for RBS in the Instant Case) by 
influencing a colleague's vote in this case. 
In both scenarios illustrated through 
Craig I and 11, Justice Brennan could 
rationally conclude that the project of best 
implementing the law according to his 
intrinsic and relational jud,ment criteria 
dictated a strategic choice to eschew his 
sincere position SS and enshrine his 
second-ranked rule IS now, thereby averting 
the present or future possibility of hls thud- 
ranked RBS. This archetypal scenario of 
unilateral strategic belzavlor can be modeled 
as follows, applying the "maptude  of 
perceived error" (MPE) concept developed 
earlier. According to Justice Brennan's 
intrinsic and relational jud,pent criteria, 
his ranking of the three rules proposed in 
Craig is as follows: R1 = SS, RZ = IS, and 
R3 = RBS. When deciding whether to vote 
strategcally, Brennan should consider both 
the likelihood of the Court ultimately 
settling on each option and the MPE 
represented by the two suboptimal rules, 
R2 and R3. With respect to the former 
variable, the more confident Brennan is that 
unless he forges a majority opinion 
coalition for IS in the Instant Case a 
majority will embrace RBS in a near future 
case (Craig I) or even the Instant Case 
(Craig II), the more willing he should be to 
vote strategcally With respect to the latter 
variable, the more he views RZ as a minor 
error and R3 as a major one, the more 
willing he should be to vote strategically 
and create a minor error in order to prevent 
a serious one. 
Unilateral strategic maneuvering of these 
types is likely a common occurrence, even 
though it typically cannot be detected by 
others. Justices quxe frequently change 
their views over the course of a decision. Of 
course, this sometimes reflects a change in 
sincere views. Sometimes this behavior is 
driven by the institutional benefits of a 
majority opinion coalition, but anecdotal 
evidence suggests that this is not the 
primary motivation. Most of the time, I 
think justices care about forgng a majority 
coalition only if it settles on a rule they 
support - at least support enough. If 
asked whether they would prefer a 
majority-opinion coalition to coalesce even 
if they would be left in dissent or 
concurrence, I'd bet most often they would 
say no. If my surmise is correct, then much 
of the documented position jockeying and 
concession granting on the Supreme Court 
reflects sti-ategc behavior designed to 
improve the content of legal mles. 
2. Bilateral vote trading. 
Justices will sometimes confront an 
opportunity to trade votes with one 
another; each of two justices votes for the 
other's sincere view on one issue in 
exchange for the other's support of his 
sincere view on another. Such an agreement 
can he either ex~licit or tacit. 
a. Explicit vote trades. Consider the 
following "vote-trading exemplar" 
illustrating explicit ~7ote trading across two 
separate cases. Suppose the Court's docket 
contains two separate cases, Case Search 
raising the question whether a particular 
search violates the Fourth Amendment, and 
Case Cruel raising the question whether a 
particular mode of execution violates the 
Eighth Amendment. The tentative 
conference vote in Case Search is 5-4 for 
the criminal defendant, with Justice Wapner 
in the majority and Justice Judy in the 
dissent. The tentative conference vote in 
Case Cruel is 5-4 for the state, with Justice 
Judy in the majority and Justice Wapner in 
the dissent. Suppose Wapner is close to 
indifferent about his apparent victory in 
Case Search, but is very troubled by his 
apparent loss in Case Cruel; conversely, 
suppose Judy is close to indifferent about 
her apparent victory in case Cruel, but is 
very troubled by her apparent loss m Case 
Search. Wapner and Judy then agree to 
trade votes across the two cases; Wapner 
switches to vote for the state in Case Search, 
and Judy switches to vote for the crimnal 
defendant in Case Cruel. From the 
perspective of each justice, the trade has 
improved the overall state of the law; each 
views the trade as creating what he or she 
considers a minor error but corrects what 
he or she considers a more major error. 
Justice Wapner is willing to sacrifice h s  
feasible victory in Case Cruel (the 
"sacrificed case") for a more meaningful 
victory in Case Search (the "acquired case"); 
for Justice Judy, the "sacrificed" and 
"acquired" cases are reversed. 
I t  is very difficult to identify clear 
examples of explicit vote trading. My own 
sense, in accord with that of other scholars, 
is that explicit vote trading rarely - and 
perhaps never - takes place. 
b. Tacit vote trades. On the other hand, 
my sense (again in accord with others) is 
that a form of implicit and informal vote 
trading is common. Sometimes, a justice - 
let's use the fictional Judge Wapner - 
quickly joins a draft opinion circulated by a 
colleague even through the doctrinal rule 
articulated does not reflect his sincere 
position. Wapner nevertheless joins quickly 
and without criticism, indeed perhaps with 
praise - because (a) he thinks the error is 
relatively minor, and (b) he wants to 
encourage the author to sign onto an 
opinion in a completely separate but more 
significant case that Wapner has recently 
circulated or will circulate soon. 
Of course, such tacit back-scratching 
"agreements" are not formally enforceable. 
The social norms of cooperation and 
congeniality prevailing on the Court, 
however, might strongly encourage a 
practice of presumptive reciprocity Thus, 
while explicit vote trading seems to be 
shunned in word and deed, a softer form of 
tacit trading may well be commonplace. 
Normative constraints 
on strategic voting 
Form-driven strategc voting appears 
relatively uncontroversial; content-driven 
strategc voting engenders much greater 
controversy Explicit vote trading is 
frequently denounced, though generally 
without clear explanation. The more 
common but subtle forms of tacit vote 
trading and Craig-like unilateral 
maneuvering either are ignored or provoke 
lukewarm concerns. My strong sense is that 
there is considerable disagreement about 
the proper line between acceptable and 
unacceptable sti-ategc behavior and the 
reason for drawing it. 
Litigant-focused constraints 
A. Sacrosanct disposition objections. 
The primary function of even appellate 
adjudication is commonly said to be 
resolving a concrete legal dispute between 
two or more litigants, with the articulation 
of legal principles being incidental to that 
task. Even assuming as I do here that 
justices identify governing legal rules first 
and derive dispositions from them, one 
might believe that once the proper 
resolution of the dispute is identified, the 
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to that resolution. 
Thrs vim d e r l i e s  what I call the 
amsanct dLspositim constraint on 
strategic behavior: a justice may vote 
strategically for a suboptimal rule only if 
her insincere vote leads to the same 
disposition as her sincere vote would have 
done. kgal rules are fair fodder for strategic 
play. but sincerely derived case d~positions 
are sacrosant. 
Depending on whether one believes this 
sacrosanct dLsposition principle should be 
unyielding or merely presumptive, a sincere 
disposition might impose either a "hardn or ' 
a "soft" constraint on rule-focused 
strategmng. 
Many people, were they a litigant in 
Case Search or Cruel, would be quite 
hturbed if they would have won had a 
justice voted sincerely. but lost because the 
justice voted strategically to improve the 
collective legal rule. 
The strength of this underlying intuition, 
however, can be questioned on its own ' ' 
terms. To begm with, theintuition 
confronts an interesting temporal question. 
By hypothesis, strategically improving the 
legal rule today affects not only who wins 
the Instant Case but also who d win 
future cases, changmg future winners 
(under the sincere rule) to future losers and 
vice versa. Why should the entitlement of 
today's would-be winner under sincere 
voting trump the entitlement of the future's 
would-be winner under the strategically 
secured improved rule3 
Moreover, the intuition seemmgly 
presumes that litigants care more about 
winning than about establishing favorable 
legal rules. lhs is not always so. Some 
, 
litigants expect to be repeat players in 
slrnilar future cases, and they may be 
d h n g  to sacrifice a particular victory for a 
more favorable legal rule over the long run. 
Some litigants who do not expect repeat 
phy may nevertheless care more about 
estabhhg favorable legal principles than 1 about winning the discrete dupute, either 
bemuse they are representing others in c k  1 litigation or because they care about the 
"pressive content of the law 
The intuition seemingly 
presumes that litigants care 
more about winning than 
about establishing favorable 
legal rules. This is not always 
so. Some litigants expect to be 
repeat players in similar future 
1 cases, and they may be willing 
1 to sacrifice a particular victory for a more favorable legal rule 1 over the long run. 
If persuasive on its own tenns, the 
disposition constraint would preclude some 
other common adjudicatory practices 
besides vote trading. First, the constraint 
contravenes some well-accepted norms 
governing solo decisionmaking that lead 
justices to support locally suboptimal 
decisions. Even if Justice Solo's intrinsic 
judgment criteria incline her to prefer rule 
R1 leading to disposition Dl, she might 
strategically endorse RZ and D2 either to 
embrace stare clecisis and maintain 
consistency with, or, alternatively, to 
compensate for, a prior case that she views 
as wrongly decided. Or, she might decide 
the Instant Case suboptimally to establish 
the best long-term precedent for a series of 
cases. Taken seriously, the disposition 
constraint would appear to rule out each of 
these well-accepted adjudicator- practices. 
Second, the disposition constraint also 
rests in tension with some more 
controversial norms governing solo 
decisionmalang. As earlier discussed, 
Alexander Bickers "passive virtues" 
sometimes lead justices to deny favorable 
judgments to would-be winners; concerns 
about public resistance sometimes lead 
justices to deny immediate remediation to 
victorious litigants; concerns about 
congressional overruling might lead justices 
to shy away from sincere rules in a manner 
depriving a would-be winner of a favorable 
judgment. 
Third, the disposition constraint would 
appear to rule out form-driven maneuvers 
in certain contexts. When a justice 
strategically forms a majority-disposition 
coalition to avold a three-disposition 
impasse, by definition she votes for a 
disposition other than her sincere choice. 
With respect to strategc voting designed to 
forge a majority-opinion coalition, 
sometimes one or more justices might 
diverge from their sincere disposition in 
order to do so. The disposition constraint 
would rule out such form-driven 
maneuvers. 
B. The litigant participation objection. 
This objection starts with the premise 
that adjudication is primarily party-driven, 
in the sense that the judicial decision is 
designed to respond to the factual proofs 
and reasoned arguments advanced by 
adversarial parties. Concomitantly, the 
integnty of adjudication also entails a 
reasoned decisionmaker, one who will 
respond to and fairly evaluate the reasoned 
arguments of the parties. 
Explicit or tacit vote trading partially 
undermines the meaningfulness of party 
participation in the Instant Case by 
introducing an influential element - the 
Other Case - that cannot readily be 
identified in advance. Parties cannot fairly 
be expected to anticipate, let alone brief, the 
entire set of other cases that might end up 
influencing the decision in the Instant Case 
through a vote trade; that set consists of 
every other case on the Court's docket. 
As a result, decisions influenced by vote 
trading are arbitrary from the litigants' 
perspective in the sense that they cannot 
participate meaningfully, through reasoned 
argument, in the critical judicial 
determination - the trading justices' 
comparative evaluation of error maptudes.  
Whether this objection is powerful 
enough to explain the consensus antipathy 
toward vote trading, however, turns on the 
significance one attaches to meaningful 
party participation through the presentation 
of reasoned arguments. The more central 
one views this role on either instrumental 
or intrinsic grounds, the more troubling 
vote trading becomes. But the more one 
believes that party-driven adjudication, 
while perhaps a good idea, is not 
normatively essential, then the less 
troubling vote trading becomes. At the far 
extreme, if one views parties as helpful but 
non-crucial judicial assistants, then the 
justices' resort to decisionmaking means 
beyond the parties' ken is not that 
disturbing at all. Recall that even vote 
trading does not devalue or ignore litigant 
participation entirely; it just values some 
non-participatory aspects of reasoning 
as well. 
Reasoned justification 
constraints 
This section explores a series of related 
objections as applied, at least initially, to 
bilateral trading. Each objection reflects a 
theme common to many jurisprudential 
paradigms: when justices declare whai the 
law is en route to deciding cases, we expect 
them to base that declaration on reasoned 
argument of a certain form. 
A. Adjudication as a justificatory 
practice. 
Many respectable jurisprudential 
paradigms hold that adjudication is, first 
and foremost, a justificatory practice. 
According to this view, the legtimacy of 
courts' authority turns on the fact that 
adjudication is a form of justification or 
reason gving, in a way that other forms of 
decisionmaking are not. If a judge does not 
have a reasoned justification for a legal 
decision, she has no legtimate claim to the 
exercise of coercive authority over the 
litigants. As a result, we are rightly hostile 
to any adjudicatory practlce that 
undermines the process and integnty of 
justification, even if that practice in some 
sense "improves" the doctrinal rules 
ultimately produced. Process, not result, 
is paramount. 
With this process focus in mind, one 
might challenge explicit and tacit vote 
trading as depriving the two traded 
dec~sions of the type of reasoned 
justification necessary to judicial legtimacy. 
After all, there seems to be an element of 
arbitrariness to the decisionmaking in both 
involved cases. In the vote-trading 
exemplar, for example, Justices Wapner and 
Judy do not take each of Cases Search and 
Cruel into account when deciding the other 
one because the result in one case 
influences their sincere ranking of the 
available rules in the other. Rather, they 
take the other case into account only 
because of the happenstance that, given the 
particular lineup of all nine justices in both 
cases, there is an available trade that both 
believe improves the set of results. If Justice 
Wapner were asked why he voted the way 
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he did in Case Search, he could not provide 
a complete answer without mentioning the 
role played by Case Cruel. While this 
reference would partially "explain" his 
decision, on the surface it would hardly 
seem to "ustify" it, at least in any sense 
familiar to the judicial enterprise. 
But reliance on familiarity here is 
dangerous, precisely because multimember 
decisonmalng may enable novel but still 
legtimate notions of justification. Viewed in 
isolation, Wapner's decision in Case Search 
seems unprincipled; he has seemingly 
"sacrificed" this case for law improvement 
elsewhere. But why view Case Search in 
isolation? The mere possibility of bilateral 
vote trading essentially allows a justice to 
vote on two issues at once as a packaged 
deal, an option generally unavailable to 
judges sitting alone. Consider Justice 
Wapner's approach to the vote-trading 
exemplar. Wapner sincerely supports Rule 
S+ over Rule S- in Case Search and Rule C+ 
over Rule C- in Case Cruel, but if everyone 
votes sincerely the Court will endorse Rule 
S- in Case Search and Rule C- in Case 
Cruel. Wapner can trade across the two 
cases with Justice Judy, meaning he can 
control whether the Court produces rules 
S+ and C- (by voting sincerely) or rules S- 
and C+ (by trading). Put differently, Wapner 
can change the relevant "choice set" from a 
choice among single rules to a choice 
among rule combinations. 
As illustrated earlier, Wapner can 
employ the "magnitude of perceived error" 
rubric to reason from his jurisprudential 
premises to the conclusion that he prefers 
package S- and C+ to package S+ and C-. 
His MPE assessment leads him to view 
collective outcome S- as a lesser error than 
collective outcome C-; he is therefore 
willing to endure the former to forestall the 
latter. He is not merely appraising the two 
combinations to see which he prefers in 
some troubling result-oriented sense. 
Rather, he is employing the very same 
process of reasoning that led him to prefer 
S+ over S- and C+ over C- in the first 
instance. 
To be sure, the comparison of rule 
packages rather than individual rules is 
unfamilar. But why would this reasoning 
process, deemed legtimate when used to 
favor one rule over another, suddenly 
become illegtimate when used to prefer 
one rule package over another? It cannot be 
problematic just because Wapner finds 
neither package ideal. T h  complaint 
would have too far-reachng consequences, 
as judges frequently must choose between 
two or more imperfect options when the 
optimal option is not feasible to secure. And 
it cannot be problematic just because there 
is a sense in which, in evaluating the MPEs 
associated with S- and C-, Wapner might be 
comparing "apples and oranges" if the two 
issues draw upon very different underlying 
principles. First, it is unclear whether such 
an apples-and-oranges comparison should 
be troubhg from a theoretical standpoint. 
But in any event, this complaint would also 
have too far-reachng consequences, as 
judges frequently must compare 
fundamentally different principles in 
ranlung alternatives. 
Let us return to the initial claim here, 
that concern for cabining illegtimate 
assertions of coercive judicial authority 
dictates hostility toward any adjudicatory 
practice that undermines the process and 
integrity of justification, even if that practice 
in some sense "improves" the doctrinal rule 
ultimately produced. It is true that vote 
trading is generally described in terms of 
improved results, not proper process. But a 
justice can provide the same type of 
justificatory explanation for a trade as for a 
single-issue ranking: the outcome chosen 
best satisfied his intrinsic and relational 
criteria talung relevant MPEs into account. 
The only difference is that the justice in a 
vote-trading scenario ranks combinations of 
rules rather than single rules. This 
distinction does not appear to make the 
ranking process any less an exercise in 
reasoned justification. 
One might nonetheless argue that the 
different ways of conceiving the choice set 
matters with respect to adjudicatory norms 
relating to explanation rather than 
justification. The next tu7o sections consider 
other norms arguably undermined by vote 
trading: candor and noncornrnodificaton of 
judgments. 
B. The candor objection. 
Explicit and tacit vote trading would 
appear to lead a justice to endorse openly a 
justification different from her true 
motivation - the MPE calculation. Thus 
decisionmalung through vote trading 
violates an oft-proclaimed norm of judicial 
candor. 
This presumption of candor is frequently 
justified on the ground that it disciplines 
judicial reasoning. The act of reducing one's 
true thought processes to written form 
stimulates critical self-scrutiny and the act 
of publication enables peers and the public 
to evaluate and hold individual justices 
accountable for their decisions. Vote tradmg 
partly avoids these disciplining and 
constraining effects of transparency, because 
the dnving force behind a justice's decision 
to trade - h s  comparative MPE assessment 
of the two rules involved - is not revealed, 
let alone publicly explained and justified. 
These justifications for candor carry 
some analytical and rhetorical force, though 
their tangible effects are highly speculative. 
This said, deciding just how much force to 
gve to such an objection is difficult. If 
embraced as a rigid constraint, the 
obligation of transparency would call into 
question a number of adjudicatory practices 
besides vote trading. Some sophsticated 
behaviors, including many of Alexander 
Bickels "passive virtues," involve judicial 
dissembling. Moreover, many 
uncontroversial form-driven strategic 
maneuvers designed to forge coalitions of 
various sizes entail the suppression of 
sincere views - indeed, that is the whole 
point of forming unanimous-opinion 
coalitions. Finally, content-driven strategc 
maneuvers such as the unilateral Craig 

In the vote-trading exemplar, justices 
trade votes based on their reasoned (though 
divergent) assessments of the rightness of 
two reasoned (though divergent) 
assessments of the rightness of two 
collective outputs. The "currency" of 
exchange is legal principle, not the traders' 
own or the litigants' preferences or desires. 
There is a sense in which two independent 
products, the rule in the sacrificed case and 
the rule in the acquired case, are appraised 
for their relative value. But justices appraise 
and compare the relative value of 
competing rules or justificatory positions all 
the time, without engendering a sense of 
problematic commodification. 
Concededly, social meaning 
reformulation is not an on-off switch, and 
commodification can range on a continuum 
from complete to less-complete forms that 
"Sear some indicia of commodification but 
are more attenuated," as Margaret Radin 
wrote in Contested Conzlnodities (1996). 
Thus, even if one agrees that the vote- 
trading exemplar is a far cry from a 
prototypical market exchange, she might 
still be somewhat troubled by indicia of 
commodification still remaining. I think 
that analytical argument cannot wholly 
resolve the dispute. 
Judicial lawmaking 
constraints 
The final set of objections revolves 
around a common intuition: vote trading 
crosses a conceptual or even constitutional 
line dividing adjudication and legslation. 
At one time thii intuition might have been 
captured by the claim that courts "declare" 
rather than "make" law, and that focus on 
law-making is an ultra vires judicial 
function. A more sophisticated and modem 
version would propose that, m a 
meaningful sense, courts do make law, but 
do so in a peculiarly judicial manner. 
Something about vote trading makes it 
seem as though justices are making law in 
an inappropriate manner, and therefore, the 
practice transgresses the proper boundaries 
of adjudication. 
We generally associate vote trading with 
legislative activity. Some people find judicial 
vote trading intuitively illegtimate, I 
believe, because they mentally associate the 
practice wth  the more familiar 
phenomenon of leplative logrolling. Based 
on this connection, they wrongly assume 
that the rationale for judicial vote trading 
would mimic that for legslative vote 
trading, and they (rightly) find the 
preference-satisfaction rationale underlying 
leplative logrolling anathema to judicial 
reasoning. The first assumption is wrong 
because judicial vote trading can be 
supported by reference exclusively to legal 
concepts and principles, and without 
necessary resort to problematic objects such 
as preference satisfaction. 
Some might object that vote trading feels 
legslative m nature because it seems to 
focus on forward-lookmg law improvement 
rather than backward-looking law 
interpretation. "Law improvement" sounds 
like a legslative task. 
This way of characterizing the judicial 
lawmalung constraint is rhetorically 
powerful. However, it ignores the significant 
extent to which well-accepted interpretive 
practices already contain a forward-loolang, 
improvement-oriented element. As 
explained earlier, relational jud,ment 
criteria require justices to look forward as 
well as backward, to select a rule that is 
optimal over a mn of related cases even if it 
might be suboptimal for the Instant Case 
viewed in isolation. The consistency 
criterion, for example, requires justices to 
envision the future cases in which today's 
rule might apply and to fashion a rule today 
that traces the optimal trajectory. 
A third objection adds the following 
premise: due to institutional distinctions 
between courts and legislatures, the goal of 
competency in lawmaking requires courts 
to employ a different lawmalang 
methodology than do legslatures. 
Legslatures are comparatively well designed 
to consider and study societal problems 
comprehensively, and to devise optimal 
forward-lo'3lcmg solutions thereto. In 
contrast, courts are not structured to be as 
proficient at seeing far into the future, or at 
perceiving and comprehensively 
considering all of the ramifications and 
interests affected by proposed doc~rinal 
rules. 
Given these observations, the argument 
continues, we have much more confidence 
in justices' ability to develop optimal 
forward-loolzing rules when the justices 
focus their attention on fashoning a direct 
response to the facts and context of the 
dispute before them, rather than when they 
engage in a self-conscious project of 
abstract law improvement. 
While the premlse of this objection - 
that courts should remain focused on 
contextualized decisionmalung - is both 
analytically and rhetorically powerful, the 
deduction that vote trading violates this 
norm demands greater scrutiny First, each 
of the two cases'involved in a vote trade 
satisfy the normal requirements for 
concreteness and adverseness. The trading 
justices (and the rest), therefore, start from 
a fact-bound, contextual setting and can 
reason outward when they construct their 
initial ranhngs of, and assess their 
magnitudes of perceived error for, the 
proposed rules in each case. 
One might characterize the next 
reasoning step in the vote-trading process 
- the comparison of MPEs in the two 
cases - to be somewhat abstracted from 
the case contests. When Justice Wapner 
considers whether the perceived sacrifice in 
Case Search is more than compensated by 
the perceived improvement in Case Cruel, 
he might ponder some seemingly abstract 
questions like the following: Is i t  more 
important for wrongful death sentences to 
be avoided than for wrongful privacy 
invasions to be allowed? This question 
(and others like it) is not tethered to a 
specific case. And yet, Justice Wapner 
would certainly be aware of how his answer 
to this question would ultinlately affect h s  
vote and therefore the disposition of these 
two concrete cases with identifiable parties. 
In other svords, the case-specific 
consequences of h s  abstract reasoning 
would be readily perceptible, at both 
intellectual and visceral levels. This remains 
a far cry from the sort of abstract legslative 
rulemalung against which the judicial 
practice is being measured. 
Perhaps a slightly different concern 
animates the comparative competence 
objection. One might argue that the 
acceptance of vote trading as a legtimate 
practice will lead justices to shift the way 
they approach adjudication in all contexts, 
involving vote trading or not. The more 
justices start thinlung about adjudication in 
terms of optimal rulemalung, a mental 
perspective facilitated by the constant 
search for potential gains from trade, the 
more they will become emboldened to 
make less case-tethered and context- 
disciplined decisions generally 
This feared transformation is certainly 
not fanciful; indeed, some might thnk 
justices are already prone to the disease of 
imagning themselves as unconstrained 
lawmakers and thnlung about litigants as 
inconvenient obstacles. But neither is the 
transformation inevitable. Surely one can 
imagne that, even as justices self- 
consciously engage in vote trading, they 
also remind themselves of the importance 
of self-disciplined focus on case contexts, 
facts, and parties. The question becomes 
whether, as a prophylactic measure, a norm 
against vote trading should be articulated 
and internalized to forestall the risk of a 
concomitant shift in the justice's self- 
understood job description. In my view, the 
prophylactic seems unnecessary, but I 
recognize this is a subjective and 
speculative judgment. 
Conclusion 
As Justice Brennan has noted, "The 
Court is something of a paradox - it is at 
once the whole and its constituent parts. 
The very words 'the Court' mean 
simultaneously the entity and its members." 
Appreciation of this paradox is reflected in 
an exciting explosion of political science 
scholarship modeling judicial behavior, 
scholarship that both predicts and tests for 
various forms of strategc or sophisticated 
conduct, and also offers new 
conceptualizations of the relationship 
between individual judges and their 
multimember courts. In particular, there is 
growing recognition that judicial behavior is 
not shaped merely by ideologcal attitudes 
and conceptions of legal reasoning, but also 
by formal institutional structures and 
informal role commitments. The question is 
not whether judges act in strategic or 
sophisticated ways, meaning whether they 
consider the consequences of their choices 
in light of the potential behavior of others. 
The question, rather, is what institutional 
commitments and conceptions shape and 
constrain judges' preferences and goals as 
they interact with colleagues to construct 
decisions of the Court. 
In particular, as noted in Supreme Court 
Decision-Making (Howard Gillman and 
Cornell W Clayton, eds., 1999), 
"[Blargaining among the justices is not 
merely a function of preferences plus an 
awareness of interactive effects; it is also an 
activity that is constituted by an evolving 
set of normative institutional perspectives. 
Because of these sorts of institutional effects 
the justices internalize an understanding of 
whether such behavior is to be considered 
professional, as well as an understanding of 
what forms of bargaining are acceptable. . . ." 
One apparent "rule of the game" of 
collegal judgng is that, while certain fonns 
of output-focused strategc behavior are 
accepted (even encouraged) and others are 
quietly tolerated, explicit vote trading is 
disallowed. In theory, this observable but 
unwritten code of conduct might reflect a 
widespread judgment that, in the long 
term, vote trading is a counterproductive 
strategy for goal-oriented judges on collegal 
courts. My strong sense, however, is that 
judges (and scholars) believe vote trading is 
wrong, not just unwise. But why? 
My conclusion here is that the answer is 
more complicated than initial intuitions 
might suggest. While vote trading and other 
strategc maneuvers can plausibly be viewed 
as furthering legitimate judicial objectives, 
I have sketched a number of objections 
suggesting that vote trading nevertheless 
constitutes improper judicial behavior. But 
different objections rest on very distinct 
foundational assumptions about the nature 
and purpose of collegal adjudication. 
Moreover, some (though not all) objections 
logcally entail that certain accepted 
strategc practices should be equally 
disapproved as well. Finally, some 
objections apply to vote trading or other 
maneuvers only in some contexts but not 
others, nuances not reflected in current 
practice. My hope is that this inquiry will 
stimulate deeper reflection about the 
"paradox" of collegal adjudication, and 
perhaps assist judges in developing a more 
refined understanding of the norms of their 
profession. 
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